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Birth Rights and Birth Wrongs
Through A Common Law Lens:
Why the No Liability Regime is
Likely to Endure

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*

Introduction: A saga in four parts: Dov Fox’s recent book, the aptly
named Birth Rights and Wrongs, is, as its title suggests, a study of the
stark conflicts that arise in the highly contested area of reproductive rights.
Fox makes the powerful case that the legal protection of reproductive
rights, in all their protean forms, is systematically under-protected relative to
two key benchmarks: the standards of ordinary decency, and social
expectations. In my view, he has an acute awareness of these failures. But
his greatest strength is also his greatest weakness, as he systematically ignores
the great successes wrought through the current system, as disjointed
as it might seem on first appearance. Since these triumphs are not sufficiently
accounted for, Fox fails to develop a general theory which explains how
these technological advances are two-sided developments.
In my view, there are always powerful incentives to do better, no
matter which way the liability or regulatory rules are set, which tends to
account for the higher performance and lower risk rates observed over time
in this area notwithstanding the void in tort and regulatory protections.

*
© 2021 Richard A. Epstein. Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, The New
York University School of Law, the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover
Institution, and the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law Emeritus
and Senior Lecturer, The University of Chicago. My thanks to Justin Rosinski and Ashleigh
Samlut, New York University School of Law class of 2021, for their excellent research assistance.
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Still, as the liability situation need not be first-best, it is important to note
that all of these birth wrongs occur not as harms to strangers, but as harms
that arise out of consensual arrangements, where contractual solutions are all
too often pushed aside in favor of adopting tort solutions that don’t quite
jibe with the situation.
Accordingly, this article is divided into four parts. Part I deals with the
paradigmatic failures; Part II deals with the underappreciated successes.
Part III offers a typology for change. Finally, Part IV deals with the serious
difficulty in finding a contractual liability scheme that is better than the
status quo.
Three paradigmatic failures: Fox begins his exposition by noting in
detail the many instances in which the miracle of birth brings forth new
life to the pleasure and celebration of all. On the other side, he develops
in exquisite detail an endless catalogue of all the mishaps that can happen
in this highly charged area. Under Fox’s useful terminology, this grim
cascade of events divides up into three categories, which he neatly summarizes
as “Procreation Deprived,” Procreation Imposed,” and “Procreation
Confounded.”
These three headings convey the basic message that the attitudes and
expectations that surround both sex and procreation are wide and diverse,
and that it is not possible to think that anyone has ever proposed one uniform
solution ideal for all women or couples. Many men and women are desperate
to have children, either now or in the future, but who find that serious
biological difficulties—sterility and disease—could easily stand in their
path. People (including single persons who hope to marry at some future
time) take steps to mitigate the dangers that have befallen them, only to
have their desires thwarted by the negligence—occasionally worse—of other
various professionals and organizations, both business and charitable, in
whom they put their trust.
There are three common patterns. One of the most common scenarios,
painfully retold by Fox, is that their precious eggs or sperm are put into
the hands of a fertility clinic only to be destroyed because of an equipment
malfunction before they can be used—procreation deprived. Next, there
are individuals who do not want to have further children even as they want
to continue to enjoy an active sex life. They discover that their supposed
birth control pills were in fact vitamins, or that a vasectomy did not take
hold, leaving them saddled with the prospect of an abortion or unwanted
children, either of which could break their psyches, personal relationships,
or finances—procreation imposed. Last, there are instances where laboratories
mishandled various specimens, resulting in offspring with serious birth
defects and genetic diseases, such as Fabry disease or Down syndrome,
which can be a burden to the family, society, or both—procreation
confounded.
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Each of these mishaps have destructive consequences, yet none of them
result from natural events, for all of them stem from the negligence of
various professional actors in the health care system. Fox belabors the
obvious point that these injuries are severe and substantial. But more
critically, he then documents with painstaking care how, all too often,
these failures are left without redress through any tort regime or regulatory
scheme.
One the one side, individual tragedies are often regarded as noncompensable
events under the tort law. The standard rationales, which I shall not belabor
here, are both numerous and unpersuasive. It is said that these losses are
too abstract, too remote, that they are only the disappointment of not getting
some indefinite future benefit and not the subject of an immediate or
tangible individual loss. Fox expresses his deep frustration with these claims,
and I think he is successful by any standard in showing that the effort to
make these serious losses disappear from view, often by mere linguistic
sleights of hand, are not worthy of the judges who defend these supposed
principles and distinctions. There is a jarring inconsistency between the
specific situations detailed above and the current tort system generally,
which has already found liability in many cases that present similar difficulties
in dealing with probabilistic valuation.
To give but one pointed example, is it so much more difficult to
calculate the loss of grieving parents in a wrongful death case if a physician’s
negligence harms the child the moment before birth rather than the
moment after? In both cases the imponderables are large. What kind of
abilities would the child have developed? What kind of personality traits
would the child have had, leading to questions of future success in work,
play and marriage? Forget about getting any reliable estimate of future
income levels—questions of valuation are devilishly difficult to solve in
the abstract, for it is next to impossible to estimate what the life fortunes
will be for an individual who dies before their personality or skills are
developed. But these estimation problems with respect to value are only
infinitesimally smaller when the death occurs a week after birth as compared
to a week before, if there are any differences at all. So why draw a hard
legal line in the sand between two types of cases that show far more
similarities than differences?
We struggle through with various guidelines and damage levels, even
if we are confident that the numbers chosen are more or less pulled out of
(not quite) thin air. We unhappily do these calculations because the deterrent
and compensation objections cannot be served with a zero damage award,
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so that some positive, even if imprecise, award tends to work better than
nothing. This enterprise is of course not risk free, because of the possibility
that excessive damages represent a second form of error against which
few, if any, precautions are taken. The level of uncertainty in damages
is an issue that runs through not only these extreme cases, but throughout
the entire tort law, especially in wrongful death cases. A conventional test
of value (which works tolerably well for the destruction or condemnation
of real property) asks what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller in a
voluntary exchange, which can often produce (especially in thick markets,
such as those that involve real estate valuation) estimates that routinely
tend to differ by ten percent, more or less. But these measures are utterly
useless here—there is no willing buyer for the life of another individual,
nor is there is a willing buyer to purchase birth defects and behavioral
abnormalities from individuals who have suffered these sorts of injuries
or deficits.
Come to think of it, there are no willing sellers of their own lives—and
only in odd cases will individuals subject themselves to pain and suffering
in order to claim some supposed financial advantage which would be
summarily stripped if it were discovered that the loss was willfully selfinflicted. Hence valuations of human life start from a shaky assumption
that seeks to estimate the amount that it would take to have a person take
a one percent increase in the risk of death, which is then multiplied,
perhaps by 100, to determine the requisite amount needed to compensate
for certain death. Of course, the connection between partial and total loss
of life is not linear, and so the inferences are necessarily uncertain whether
we use these figures to compensate individuals through the tort system, or
to determine the value of some “statistical life” to deal with environmental
risks from various kinds of mishaps ranging from hurricanes to disease.
But here, the best is not allowed to become the enemy of the good. Thus,
the collective “we” perseveres, and continues to do so within the confines
of traditional tort doctrine for issues that are encountered in every area of
life. We know that the one figure that is wrong for all of these cases is zero,
and yet it is just that number that is picked when liability is denied on any
of these grounds.
As hinted above, the situation on the regulatory side is every bit as
problematic. We know that losses of biological specimens, or the conduct
of improper tests, have potentially deadly consequences. Thus, in an
ordinary malpractice case, liability is a slam dunk if a physician uses the
wrong reagents, or stores various plasmas and fluids intended for human
use in a way that compromises their chemical integrity. Why then should
losses associated with procreation be treated in a different fashion?
Again, I can see no principled reason why the three classes of cases should
fall outside of government regulation under some per se rule when so
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many other transactions or activities in the health care space are already
covered. Indeed, the common pattern today is to have dual systems—the
FDA can regulate the permits and warnings for new drugs, while
a medical malpractice suit serves as a backstop for individual cases of
harms that still nonetheless occur. Admittedly, I think this system can go
seriously awry insofar as it allows for tort actions to be brought for
allegedly inadequate warnings, say, even when these warnings have been
approved by the FDA.1 The correct response in cases of this sort is not to
allow juries to second-guess the FDA, whose major weakness is to
overemphasize the downside of treatments. Rather, the appropriate course of
action is to gather this new information in an orderly fashion, after which
it can be used to revise the standard warnings and instructions associated
with the drug reaching the market. The greater predictability of outcomes
thus obtained is a far preferable outcome to having juries find large verdicts
against physicians and companies that have played by the rules.
However, Fox does not use the topic of birth rights and birth wrongs to
deal with questions of regulatory excess. Instead, he deals only with those
cases for which there is evidently far too little regulation against welldefined harms that could be sensibly prevented. A rule that protected parties
from a tort action if they complied with public regulations would not constitute
the kind of legal vacuum that Fox decries in this book. Yet indeed, quite
the opposite, this is a legal regime that he should encourage, because it
would allow companies to realize that they have the benefit of a safe
harbor if they comply with standards that are well-known and established
in advance, without having to expose themselves to the vagaries of a tort
system whose complex risk/utility balancing tests offer no safe harbor to
insulate a defendant from liability.2 The effect of that uncertainty is to
reduce the flow of capital and expertise into this area, which could in fact
slow down the rate of medical and technical innovation, with adverse
consequences to individuals for whom reproductive rights are an issue.
Again and again, it should be stressed that the ideal system of tort and
regulation does not try to minimize the number of accidents that occur
without compensation. That number could easily be driven to zero by the
1. See, e.g., Wyeth Inc. v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), critiqued in Richard A.
Epstein, What Tort Theory Tells Us About Federal Preemption: The Tragic Saga of Wyeth
v. Levine, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. LAW. 485 (2010).
2. See, e.g., John Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
MISS. L.J. 825 (1973), critiqued in Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO
STATE L.J. 469 (1987).
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imposition of some combination of heavy fines on the one hand and tort
damage actions on the other—but what is essential to consider in this state
of the world is the accompanying reduction in the number of cases for
which needed reproductive treatment would be supplied. If the market
were to dry up under the weight of harsh liability standards, it could in the
extreme lead to a world with no mishaps and no activities.
So do this simple calculation. In one state of the world, there are one
thousand value-adding procedures performed, out of which twenty go
bad, with all twenty the victims receiving full compensation. In a second
state of the world, there are ten thousand such procedures, out of which one
hundred cases go bad, but with no adverse event receiving any compensation.
Which world do we prefer? I would take the second, even if you put aside
the evident fact that the transactions costs of running a legal system without
compensation are zero, while those costs in a system with compensation
are very expensive and drawn out. Simply put, in the first case we only
have a thousand successful events, if we accept the questionable assumption
that the twenty cases in which compensation is supplied are left as well
off as they would have been if the injuries had never happened. But this
is a rosy assumption, as it is quite likely that the errors in application are
such that some of the people who get compensation do not deserve it,
while others who deserve compensation will not get it—notwithstanding
that in many cases, such as the birth wrongs described above, no amount
of compensation can make an aggrieved individual whole. Not only do
these errors result in individual injustices, but they also undermine the
deterrence function of the tort system. Why bother to take a high level of
precautions if you could be wrongfully sued no matter how well you
perform? Likewise, why bother to take the same high level of precautions
if you are likely to get off either way? These cases do not have the kind
of clarity that is possible to achieve in traffic accidents, where the rules of
the road in most cases make determinations of liability far more accurate
than they are in the shadowy area of reproductive rights.
Now look at the dynamics of the second scenario. Here, we have 9,900
clear value-added successes against one hundred clear poor outcomes,
which suggests that the increase in the number of happy outcomes wholly
dwarfs the predicament of the hundred randomly chosen losers. Of course,
these assumptions could be contestable, but not, I think, on the ground
that higher success rates count for nothing. And if we look at the rate of
medical progress, historically, it is very difficult to find a close connection
between the rate of tort actions on the one side and regulatory innovations
on the other.
There are no meaningful studies that address this issue in connection
with reproductive rights, where the volume of litigation is relatively small.
However, a recent book that seeks to examine the effects of various kinds
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of tort reform on the frequency and reliability of the tort system, Medical
Malpractice Litigation: How It Works, Why Tort Reform Hasn’t Helped,
paints a mixed picture (at best) of the benefits that the invocation of tort
remedies can supply.3 As the authors note, the object of the system is a
combination of justice in the individual case combined with overall deterrence.
The book then documents the litany of difficulties that come in designing
the overall system, in terms of both error and expenses. It notes how
difficult it is to assign the blame for rising liability costs, as there are likely
imperfections in both the tort system and in the insurance markets. It also
notes how difficult it is to draw any operational distinction between the
administration of “careful” medicine as opposed to flatly “defensive” medicine.
Contrary to what one might expect, the book finds that subtle refinements
in liability influence the outcome in only a few cases, and even then only
to an uncertain extent. They are unlikely to make any change in either the
overall frequency or severity of litigation. Indeed, the only kind of reform
that appears to meaningfully impact primary behavior is a cap on damages,
which are typically restricted to pain and suffering. But again, it is hard
to decide whether or not the changes that are observed improve the overall
social calculus. It is commonly the case that the huge verdicts announced
in a few cases are trimmed on appeal, so that the total payouts are less than
these numbers would isolate.4 I would describe the tone of Medical Malpractice
Litigation as fatalistic. As a general rule, the more careful the analysis
required to prove the point, the less confident we should be about the particular
reforms in question. In my view, that uneasiness should carry over into
the area of reproductive rights and wrongs. Liability reforms have not made
much of a difference when they have sought to limit liability. They are
not likely to make much of a difference if they were to increase liability.
So the question then becomes, where does the needed action actually take
place?
Many underappreciated successes: At this point, it is important to pick
up the pieces that Fox may be missing in his dramatic account. Quite
3. BERNARD S. BLACK ET AL., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION: HOW IT WORKS,
WHY TORT REFORM HASN’T HELPED (2021).
4. See, e.g., Katie Thomas, $8 Billion Verdict in Drug Lawsuit Is Reduced to $6.8
Million, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/17/health/jnjrisperdal-verdict-reduced.html [https://perma.cc/MC39-NTL2]; Jonathan Stempel, U.S.
Judge Slashes Roundup Jury Award to $25.3 Million; Bayer Still Plans to Appeal, REUTERS
(July 15, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bayer-glyphosate-lawsuit/u-s-judgeslashes-roundup-jury-award-to-25-3-million-bayer-still-plans-to-appeal-idUSKCN1UA2CH
[https://perma.cc/T74V-KKCQ].
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simply, his exclusive focus on the failures of the current system ignores
the success within that system—an observation that, as we shall see, tends
to play out not only here, but in medical malpractice litigation as well.
To revert to the Fox analysis, his discussions of individual cases of
failure are done without attention to the overall systematic effects. I am
not an expert on this topic, but it is not difficult to assemble a host of
data that talks about the rate of progress within the health care system as
measured by a set of variables, such as the number of cases in the system,
the rate of success, and of course, their associated costs. With a little bit
of research, it was possible to collect some numbers about the state of play
in connection with in vitro fertilization (IVF), a program that began with
the birth of Louise Brown a little over 40 years ago. On this point, I summarize
an obvious puff piece produced by Shady Grove Fertility entitled Evolution
of IVF Treatment.5 The highlights include improved pregnancy and delivery
rates with an accompanying decrease in twin and multiple pregnancies.
Of course, what drives these changes are not any particular reforms in the
legal system as such, which has remained relatively constant over time.
Rather, it has been the relentless improvement of the techniques that are
used to conduct IVF, leading to the observed consistent trend in improvement.
More concretely, when Shady Grove Fertility began in 1993, they
achieved a 32 percent delivery rate for women under the age of forty.
Twenty years later, that number has moved sharply upward, as the clinic
now achieves a 43 percent delivery rate for women under the age of forty.6
Part of the explanation for this trend is improved culture media that allow
for eggs after retrieval to receive better nutrition until they reach the socalled blastocyst stage, just prior to implantation. Better nutrition reduces
uncertainty, and with it the need for multiple transplants. These embryos,
moreover, can now be transferred directly into the uterus, instead of into
the fallopian tubes. The eggs, moreover, are of much better quality due
to advances in genetic testing which can remove from the reproductive
cycle defective embryos, resulting in the occurrence of fewer miscarriages
and fewer birth defects. In addition, the rise of improved freezing techniques,
most notably vitrification, has allowed for the storage of eggs and embryos
that can be used at some later time, where results indicate that the success
rates are today comparable for those observed in what is termed “fresh”
IVF cycles. This delayed practice is of obvious importance for women
who should need to wait until they are cured of diseases before it is
safe for them to become pregnant. Similarly, it allows for married couples
5. Evolution of IVF Treatment, SHADY GROVE FERTILITY (July 17, 2018), https://
www.shadygrovefertility.com/blog/treatments-and-success/evolution-of-ivf-treatment/
[https://perma.cc/D2EH-D9WT].
6. Additionally, for women under the age of 35, the delivery rate is 57 percent. Id.
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to store fertilized eggs if the husband has to undergo chemotherapy or other
treatments that could result in the destruction of their capacity to have
offspring. Applied across the vast multitude of IVFs happening across the
world, these are huge advances, and they dwarf the number of losses that
take place through the (inexcusable) mishandling of fertilized eggs.
These results are even more impressive when appreciating that the
noted higher success rates have occurred even as technological advances
have allowed for IVF clinics to tackle cases that were deemed untreatable
a generation before. Thus, the Shady Grove Report states that today, the class
of treatable conditions includes such dysfunctions as endometriosis, male
factor infertility, advanced reproductive age issues, ovulatory dysfunctions,
and even some cases of unexplained infertility. To expand on one previously
untreatable condition, it has long been known that the difficulties in IVF
cases do not solely reside on the female side, as weak sperm counts have
historically been a major source of infertility, which in many cases forced
married couples to rely on sperm donors for fertilization. But starting in
the 1990s, a process known as intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI)
has been used to allow previously infertile husbands to become fathers as
well.
The upshot is that, as of 2018, some eight million IVF babies have been
born worldwide. Therefore, the relevant numbers to identify are the rates
of IVF failures that have occurred over the past four decades and their
corresponding rates of decline. To briefly describe the situation, as stated
above, perhaps the most notable IVF failure is that of twin or other multiple
pregnancies. However, rapid gains have been made on this front—in
2006, for women under the age of 35, 32.4% of IVF deliveries involved
twins.7 Just ten years later, the 2016 IVF twin rate had plummeted to
7.0%.8 Additionally, a well-chronicled disorder associated with IVF is that
of ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS), an adverse event resulting
from drug treatment given before an IVF.9 Over the past ten years, great
progress has been made with respect to identifying high-risk patients, as
7. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2006 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES, NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 89
(2006), https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/archived/2006-ART_508tagged.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4W8P-3QN9].
8. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY, NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 5 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2016report/ART-2016-National-Summary-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7FZ-U9D3].
9. See, e.g., Pratap Kumar et al., Ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome, 4 J. HUM.
REPROD. SCI. 70 (2011).
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well as modifications to traditional dosage regimes and the introduction
of new drugs that have collectively significantly reduced instances of
moderate and severe OHSS.10 None of this is unexpected—a combination
of knowledge that comes from the development of sound protocols, coupled
with a steady stream of technological advances, all seem to point in one
direction. Unfortunately, there is a regrettable tendency to talk only of the
failures, which are all heartbreaking in their own way. But it is equally,
indeed more important, to talk about the success stories as well, and these
numbers look very much like the simple hypothetical calculations that I
introduced above.
The pattern that has been observed in connection with reproductive rights
is I think capable of generalization. Across all industries and situations,
the general tendency is for accident rates to fall over time. That situation
is certainly true with respect to automobile accidents and traffic fatalities.
To emphasize the point, while the raw numbers certainly ignore many
confounding variables, fatal automobile crashes per 100 million annual
vehicle-miles of travel decreased from 36.00 in 1900 to 1.36 in 2007, a
more than 26-fold decrease.11 And the same trend holds true with respect
to pipeline accidents. While the frequency of accidents and fatalities in
this domain are somewhat sporadic as compared to motor vehicle incidents,
given the relatively small absolute number of pipeline accident cases,
a study analyzing over four decades of pipeline incidents reports that from
1968–2009, “fatalities and injuries from pipeline accidents are generally
decreasing over time.”12 And again, the same trend is present with respect
to railroad accidents. Excluding highway-railroad crossing accidents, the
United States had an average of 7.5 train-related fatalities per year across
2009–2019.13 This rate stands in stark contrast to the average 1990–1999
train-related fatality rate of 18.4 deaths per year.14
Beyond the accident rates described above, there have been substantial
positive increases in outcomes with respect to essentially any disease or
condition that has been documented in the medical literature. Consider
infant mortality rates—in 1980, there were 12.6 deaths per 1,000 live births

10. Omar El Tokhy et al., An update on the prevention of ovarian hyperstimulation
syndrome, 12 WOMEN’S HEALTH 496 (2016).
11. FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC FATALITIES,
1900 – 2007 (Jan. 2009), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2007/pdf/
fi200.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2UB-LP6L].
12. Kyle Siler-Evans et al., Analysis of pipeline accidents in the United States
from 1968 to 2009, 7 INT. J. CRIT. INFRASTRUCTURE PROT. 257 (2014).
13. BUREAU OF TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS, TRAIN FATALITIES, INJURIES, AND
ACCIDENTS BY TYPE OF ACCIDENT, https://www.bts.gov/content/train-fatalities-injuriesand-accidents-type-accidenta [https://perma.cc/97QZ-99FB].
14. Id.

76

JCLI_23_EPSTEIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 23: 67, 2021]

11/29/2021 10:03 AM

Through a Common Law Lens
THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

in children under twelve months old, compared to only 5.96 deaths per
1,000 live births in children under twelve months old in 2013.15 Across
1944–1954, a patient with breast cancer had only a 25.1% chance of surviving
ten-years after their initial diagnosis; for 1995–2004, the ten-year survival
rate had increased to 76.5%.16 Even disorders affecting remarkably small
populations of individuals have seen tremendous advances in treatment
options over the past several years.17 As a recent notable example, on May
24, 2019, Novartis’s Zolgensma® was approved by the FDA, the first gene
therapy for pediatric patients with spinal muscular atrophy (SMA), potentially
representing the only long-term cure for the rare disorder, which occurs in
only 1 in 10,000 live births.18 Invariably, these increases can be attributed
to collective improvements in molecular biology and biochemistry, enabling
enhanced pharmaceutical drug design and discovery, personalized treatment
regimes through basic disease genotyping, and so much more.
At this time, it is also appropriate to add a reference to the enormous
progress in the design of vaccines, driven by new technology in the
response to Operation Warp Speed, which managed to bring to market
multiple vaccines that to date have proved far more effective and safe than
anyone had imagined when this process was first started by the Trump
administration in March 2020. The overall process involved new technologies
for the design and fabrication of the disease.19 It also involved improvements

15. Carrie K. Shapiro-Mendoza et al., CDC Grand Rounds: Public Health Strategies to
Prevent Preterm Birth, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 826 (2016).
16. Aman Buzdar, Breast Cancer Survival on the Rise, CONQUEST, MD ANDERSON
CANCER CENTER (2011), https://www.mdanderson.org/publications/conquest/breast-cancersurvival.h37-1586679.html [https://perma.cc/832T-QQ4D].
17. Raymond A. Huml et al., Accelerating Rare Disease Drug Development:
Lessons Learned from Muscular Dystrophy Patient Advocacy Groups, 55 THERAPEUTIC
INNOVATION & REGUL. SCI. 370 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1007/s43441-020-00221-4.
18. Novartis Press Release, AveXis receives FDA approval for Zolgensma®, the
first and only gene therapy for pediatric patients with spinal muscular atrophy (SMA),
(May 24, 2019), https://www.novartis.com/news/media-releases/avexis-receives-fdaapproval-zolgensma-first-and-only-gene-therapy-pediatric-patients-spinal-muscularatrophy-sma [https://perma.cc/Y4FZ-3L77].
19. Peter Loftus, Covid-19 Vaccines Yield Breakthroughs in Long-Term Fight
Against Infectious Diseases, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
covid-19-vaccines-yield-breakthroughs-in-long-term-fight-against-infections-disease11614537238 [https://perma.cc/M8LT-34Z4].
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in the overall distribution of the vaccine.20 The processes developed in
this effort will clearly spill over to find new applications in other areas.
Overall, these beneficial results cannot be attributed to any major
change in the system of liability rules. Indeed, with respect to vaccines,
the burdens of liability have been so great that Congress intervened in
order to prevent the wholesale destruction of the vaccine market with
duty-to-warn product liability suits.21 In other areas, it is unlikely that the
product liability rules have contributed much to safety either.22 Indeed,
the height of liability in torts was probably achieved in the early 1980s,
which is one of the reasons explaining that period’s large spurt in cases
often attributable to asbestos-related23 or silicon-related conditions,24 or
medical conditions resulting from the administration of DES to pregnant
women,25 even if the manifestation of those losses was delayed for a
generation or more. So if it has not been through any notable reform in
liability rules, what has been driving the change behind all of the positive
increases noted above? Improvements in every single factor of production,
from cars, to roads, to communications, and so on down the line. The same
situation of course applies with respect to all forms of infrastructure, such
that the newer the product, the safer the overall situation, which means
that quick replacement of obsolete stock with the most current, cuttingedge technology is far more important than any liability rule for any damage
that may occur. Delay in innovation is the ultimate danger in an field with
innovation technology.
A typology for change: It is important to see why all this is so. For
example, the famous 1932 case of The T.J. Hooper is said to stand for the
legal proposition that because an entire calling can “lag” in its adoption
20. Peter Loftus, Covid-19 Vaccine Manufacturing in U.S. Races Ahead, WALL ST.
J. (Mar. 21, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-19-vaccine-manufacturing-in-u-sraces-ahead-11616328001 [https://perma.cc/5T9Q-AC9C].
21. See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)
(1), (capping damages at $250,000 given proof of vaccine caused injury, which is not that
easy to establish); See also Paffold v. Sec’y Health & Human Services, 451 F.3d 1352, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2006). For an early critique of the liability rules in vaccine cases, see Peter
Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985).
22. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1436 (2010).
23. Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States: A Brief Overview,
THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, RAND (1991) (noting that from “1980 through 1984,
approximately 10,000 [asbestos] cases were filed – about a ten-fold increase over the
preceding five-year period.”).
24. See, e.g., In re Corning, Inc., Sec. Litig., 349 F. Supp. 2d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(detailing the first judgement finding liability for defective silicone breast implants in
1984).
25. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980).
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of safety precautions, industry custom can never set standard of care.26
Yet, this statement is based on an erroneous interpretation of the facts,
which resulted in the court focusing on the wrong question. In that case,
the court asked whether ships at sea should have radios that would allow
them to receive storm warnings. However, the problem didn’t arise out
of a crash between two ships. Instead, a barge owner brought the suit
against the tug that was towing his boat up past the Delaware breakwater.
The two parties were in privity with each other and were both anxious to
cut the best deal they could. When parties are in privity we do not face
problems of low level of precautions, which can lead to strangers being
harmed, and for which a strict liability rule is often appropriate. But in
these cases, it is often ruinous to apply strict liability standards. In fact,
in medical malpractice strict liability is uniformly rejected because the
patient (unlike the stranger in many cases) does not want the activity to
stop and thus has to moderate the demands. As a result, negligence, usually
in connection with the accepted standard of care in the particular line of
medicine, is the proper standard.
Once we are in these consensual arrangements between repeat sophisticated
players the simple but insistent question is who would resist that
innovation? In The TJ Hooper, the only ambiguity in the record was
whether the captain or the boatowner should supply the radio. But Judge
Learned Hand confused the entire situation,27 writing as if the failure of
this one boat to be equipped with a radio was evidence of some backward
industry-wide custom, when, in reality, it was just a blunder that rendered
the boat unseaworthy, as the district court below had found without further
ado.28 The analysis slightly differs in cases where one boat crashes into
another, but even in that situation there is a high correlation between
outcomes and the choice of liability rule—for example, negligence versus
strict liability. In any event, the risk of loss of one’s own life and limb
also creates strong pressures on both parties to take these precautions to
protect both themselves and others. So just as with the consensual case,
there are strong incentives to adopt new technologies regardless of the
legal rule. Unfortunately, Hand’s analysis, which missed these dynamics,
has taken on a life of its own. As a result, there are huge deadweight losses

26. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
27. See Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History
of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1992).
28. The T.J. Hooper, 53 F.2d 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
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in product liability cases today, as juries and judges second guess various
design decisions in developing many factor tests to decide whether some
design was or was not unreasonably dangerous.29
It is important in dealing with reproductive technologies to reflect on
the relationship between the liability rule and the level of technical progress.
These are consensual cases so that the transmission of information and the
control of risk should take place more rapidly than in cases involving
strangers. The TJ Hooper offers a reference point. In The Costs of
Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis, Guido Calabresi explains that
a liability rule can only shift the loss from one party to another in the hopes
that putting it on some efficient party will reduce the sum of accident costs
and the costs of their prevention. 30 In the ideal contractual world, the
parties will shift that liability to the cheaper cost avoider, assuming that
this party could be identified. But Calabresi’s simple formulation cannot
account for the fact that the ideal solution involves a joint care situation
in which the contribution of one party only makes sense if the other party
makes good on its part of the deal. Nor is there any guarantee in these
cases that the correct solution will remain constant across different parties,
different technologies, or different places. But amidst all of that variation,
one point remains constant: both parties would much prefer to find a way
to eliminate the risk rather than shifting it back and forth. So if there were
no liability for tugs that carried no radios, non-radio-carrying tugs could
not attract the level of business that a firm that announced it had the latest
radio communications could (even without warranties). If there were
liability, the non-radio-carrying tug owners would take precautions to
minimize the risk. Indeed, no matter what the liability rule, a sensible firm
would advertise that it has radios that allow it to track the weather. Thus,
we see the innovation market will not be particularly responsive to changes
in liability rules, because no matter what they are, both sides are better off
if the risk is eliminated. As a result, drive for improvement continues apace,
which is exactly what we observe here.
The same evolution takes place in medicine. The number of lawsuits is
not a good measure of the overall state of affairs. Instead, we should look
to whether improvements in technology allow for the use of more ambitious
techniques that could not be done a generation earlier regardless of the
liability rule. The reality is we observe exactly this kind of innovation in
various areas. To give but one illustration, there was a time when it was
not possible to administer anesthetics on a continuous basis, and so patients
29. John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.
J. 825 (1973); Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 469 (1987).
30. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970).
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had to be heavily dosed to make sure they did not wake up toward the end
of a difficult operation. Just who should be opposed? Once it became
possible to give incremental dosages, the all-or-nothing cases became far
less common. As a result, the number of cases in which heavily sedated
patients were injured trying to get out of bed was sharply reduced. 31
Innovative changes like these exist in drug treatments, surgery, and just
about every other area of endeavor. They take place at about the same rate
as with the reproductive technologies and for the same reasons. So, if
one looks again at the pessimistic conclusion about the state of tort reform
in medicine, it is a side issue relative to the transformation in techniques,
sometime frequent and incremental, and other times uncommon but
discontinuous. There is a huge market for these innovations in a no-liability
world just as there is a huge market in a liability world. So the message remains
the same, looking too hard at the downside overlooks the major gains on
the upside.
IV. Contractual refinement. The gravamen of the above argument is
that liability rules do not matter as much as technical innovation in a
consensual arrangement where, as a first approximation, both sides can be
made better off with any improvement, regardless of the liability rule.
Over a very broad range of cases this is true. But there are situations when
an extrinsic liability risk—one imposed as a matter of law, and not by the
parties—can become so great that it can, at least in the short run, lead to
a breakdown of the market. If the liability rule imposes a net cost that
exceeds the gain from voluntary exchange, the market breaks down. This
has happened periodically in medical malpractice cases when, for example,
the price for medical services cannot be raised sufficiently to cover the
anticipated risk of liability. Indeed, in this area the decisive precedent was
handed down in 1963, for at that time, it was clear that the basic doctrines
of medical malpractice—the use of a customary standard of care, and the
cautious use of res ipsa loquitur—were breaking down. Hence health care
providers sought to fill the gap by contractual limitations on liability, for
which they were roundly rebuffed.32 In so doing, judicial regulation was
left unimpeded, which eventually led to the medical malpractice crises that
arose in the mid-1970s for one simple reason: the diversion between the legal
31. For one such case, dealing with informed consent, see Canterbury v. Spence,
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
32. Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92 (1963). For the
parallel anti-contractual bias in product liability law, see Greenman v. Yuba Power, 59 Cal.2d
57 (1963).
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rules on the one side, and the optimal contract regime on the other, became
sufficiently great that adjustments in either the price term or other conditions
were not sufficient to keep the market fully active, so in the locales where
the impact was greatest, some contraction of the market occurred. Such a
breakdown could last until the next round of innovation reduces the
probability of occurrence to a low enough level that the market could then
start to revive. Indeed, today with superior technology, the malpractice
issue looms far smaller because the frequency of adverse events goes down,
and with it the possibility of major litigation.
Given the ebb and flow in these markets, it becomes clear why, in
principle, there is a place for limitation on damages to prevent matters
from going out of control. The first approximation in these cases is that
the proper (expectation) measure of damage is equal to the gains that the
innocent party would have received if the party in breach had performed
in full. That formulation does work well in certain financial cases, as when
an owner of goods sells them out from his buyer to some third party. In these
cases, there is a learned debate as to whether the party who wrongfully sold
the goods is entitled to the gains that the seller had received or whether, as in
Acme Mills & Elevator Co. v. Johnson, the buyer is only entitled to lost
profits.33 The dispute between expectation and restitution in case of nondelivery
because of resale at a profit raises an esoteric issue because no matter which
measure of damage is used, the party in breach always has the resources
to pay for the losses in question. Thus, in Acme Mills, the contract price
for wheat for future delivery was $1.03 per bushel. The wheat was wrongfully
sold to a third party $1.16 per bushel, as the price of wheat had risen sharply
between the signing of the contract and the delivery date, before it fell
back down again to $0.97. If we use the expectation measure, the buyer
would owe the seller money given the decline in prices, a result that never
happens typically because the seller will always deliver fungible goods.
But if the price goes up, requiring the seller in the wrong to disgorge the
profits will not be the mark of financial ruin because he always has a fund
at his disposal—namely, the higher payment received from the third party
buyer—that is sufficient to cover the loss in question. Neither measure of
damage therefore threatens to impose intolerable burdens on the operation
of the system.
The same is not true, however, when the expectation measure of damages
no longer deals with lost profits, but instead is intended to cover consequential
losses sustained by the buyer of goods or the purchaser of services from
the defendant’s breach. Those losses in question could be, and indeed often
are, far in excess of the purchase price of the goods—as would be the case

33.
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if, for example, a defendant sells a plaintiff a camera for $1,000 which is
then taken to the top of Mount Everest for pictures for an expensive spread
for National Geographic for $100,000, only to fail because of some defect
in the equipment. In general, no seller of goods (even—or especially—
if apprised of the purpose of the purchase) would agree to pay for losses of
that magnitude because he could not procure insurance to cover that loss
and still remain in business. The usual solution therefore is to impose a
limitation on consequential damages, often in the form of a liquidated
damage clause that limits, say, the loss in the event that the camera malfunctions
to the purchase price of the good, even some fraction thereof, or indeed any
fixed number that is acceptable to both parties.
The result here doesn’t overreach as it’s efficient from the ex-ante
perspective. At this point, the buyer knows that she will be without protection
in the event of failure, which incentivizes her to take steps in advance of
the loss to mitigate potential damage. The simplest way to do this is to
buy two cameras from independent vendors so that the backup from the
second reduces the probability of loss to an acceptable level. It is also the
case, however, that the buyer still would want some assurance that her
seller would take precautions at his end to reduce the likelihood of product
failure. A positive sum for consequential losses equal to $100 supplies a
powerful signal that the reliability of the camera is sufficiently high that
the seller can insure (or self-insure) over that risk and still turn on profit
on the transaction. Thus, if there were a 10 percent chance of failure, the
seller would be bankrupt because the entire purchase price would have to
fund the insurance, leaving none revenues to supply the goods sold.
Limited consequential damages thus operate as an effective signal that the
risk of loss is (probably) well under one-percent, so that the purchase of
two cameras for the trip reduces the risk of loss to at most one part in ten
thousand on the numbers posited.
This feature applies not only to contracts for sales of goods, but also to
delivery contracts, as in the famous case of the delayed delivery of the
crankshaft in Hadley v. Baxendale.34 The standard formula that speaks of—
to use Fuller’s standard terminology—restitution, reliance, and expectation
damages misses the entire market dynamic.35 In some cases we may need
a precise dollar figure, while in others we need a formula for damages.

34. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
35. Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law
of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1989).
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This principle carries to the workers’ compensation system, where
employer and employee incentives work together to ensure the level of
overall injury is below that which occur in a tort law system that contains
the standard contributory and assumption of risk defenses. Limited transfer
payments let the seller signal to its employees that it has taken appropriate
precautions (often backed up by insurance and inspections), while workers
are similarly incentivized to take care to avoid injury because they know
that the compensation payments do not fully offset their personal losses.
The level of workers’ compensation is deliberately set below the expected
losses, pecuniary and otherwise, to the injured worker, but in turn eliminates
defenses based on assumption of risk and contributory negligence. A
broad coverage formula with limited damages produces a figure that can
be insured against at low enough levels that it can be covered solely with
firm revenues. At the same time, workers are incentivized to take precautions
not to get injured on the job as any compensation for injury would be at
below-market levels.
Workers’ compensation systems should reduce the number of overall
injuries compared to those covered by contributory negligence and assumption
of risk defenses. How do we know?36 These systems were adopted voluntarily,
before required by law, when the risk of injury was high enough that
administration of a compensation system was worthwhile. As a result,
worker’ compensation systems were often adopted in mines, mills, and
railroads, where accidents were most frequent.
The question then arises as to how this analysis can be applied to
reproductive losses. As in other contexts, full tort damages may prove
too burdensome, while zero damages may expose the patient or patients to
excessive risk of loss. In principle, we should be able to think of some system
of liquidated damages that could operate much like it does in contractual
cases of defective goods or their delayed delivery (as in Hadley) or workplace
injuries. However, these systems have not been observed in practice. Why
is that the case?
One possible reason is that parties anticipate these systems won’t stand
up in court such that judicial invalidation makes expenditures pointless.
Another explanation is that it becomes difficult to figure out what counts
as the compensation event that triggers the payment. This is difficult in
the extreme when procedures fail, but less so in cases where the breakdown
comes in the form of a mechanical failure like that of a cooling element at
some storage facility. Even in the latter case, it’s unclear how risk should
be allocated if the electrical grid fails for reasons beyond the owner’s
36. Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers’
Compensation, 16 GA. L. REV. 775 (1982).
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control. In any event, it seems these devices are obsolete today. As a
result, we can assume the error rates are sufficiently low that no one thinks
that the introduction of some compensation system makes sense. It’s
costly to devise any system of this sort, and the possible gains are offset by
the usual deadly combination of administration and error costs, both broadly
conceived.
Therefore, it’s possible to interpret Fox’s data very differently. His
stories of reproductive losses that matter are surely correct. But his failure
to grapple with two other points undercuts the case for a fundamental
revision of either direct regulation or liability rules. First, no one wants
to jeopardize the massive gains from the system. Second, any system of either
tort or schedule damages could jeopardize those gains. All social institutions
are formulated in a second-best world. In this instance, leaving matters to
run their course without legal intervention may be the most prudent course
of action. Perhaps what’s most telling is that neither the public nor the
profession are clamoring for any type of legal reform, which certainly was
not the case when the medical malpractice system fell out of whack. The
higher the level of performance on the ground, the weaker the case for a
stronger system of liability. The power of the status quo ante on matters
of this sort should never be underestimated. So some birth wrongs will go
unredressed, as the overall success rate improves—the right result.
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